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CASENOTE
Protection of the Public Against
Litigious Suits ("PPALS"): 1 Using 1993
Federal Rule 11 to Turn SLAPPs

Around
I. INTRODUCTION
There is a chill in the ire of petitioning activity' in states including
New Mexico, portending a cold, snowy blanket of unconstitutional silence
threatening to settle over participatory voices in the Land of Enchantment
Those who, like New Mexico's SouthWest Organizing Project (SWOP),
wish to brave these elements and speak out on the issues of the day,
unfortunately better bundle up-for the forecast is that, absent a call to
procedural3 arms, the First Amendment climate is about to take a turn for
the worse.

1. The acronym describes methods, particularly sanctions under Rule 11, available to
be utilized against SLAPPs. SLAPP is an acronym for Strategic Lawsuit Against Public
Participation and was coined by George Pring and Penelope Canan. GEORGE W. PRING &
PENELPE CANAN, SLAPPS: GrrMG SUED FOR SPEAKING Our 3 (1996).
2. While the Frst Amendment of the United States Constitution states that "Congress
shall make no law... abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the
people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances,"
US. CONSr. amend. I,the scope of petitioning for redress of grievances has been stretched far
beyond its express language. PlMNG & CANAN, supra note 1, at 16. Justice Holmes interpreted
the petition clause as a mandate that ideas survive competition in global rialto as the ultimate
test of their power. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
Petitioning activity has since been exulted to that of a most precious of liberties, Mine
Workers v. Illinois Bar Ass'n, 389 U-S 217,222 (1967), as well as an international human right
Article 21 (1) of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217, U.N. Doc. 1/77/7,
at 3 (1948).
Petitioning activity thus encompasses and protects not only complaining, debating,
demonstrating and lobbying, but also, as pertains to this note, litigation-a fundamental
petitioning tool to redress grievances. PRING & CANAN, supra note 1, at 17. In the
labor/antitrust context, the court in Bill Johnson's Restaurants v. NLRB, 461 U.S. 731 (1983)
reinforced the notion that "the right of access to the courts is an aspect of the First
Amendment right to petition the Government for redress of grievances." Id. at 741. However,
as will be discussed shortly, the right is not without qualification.
3. Although it may already be too late, either a disclaimer or at least a bit of foreboding
language is appropriate here. This will not be, nay, it cannot be, a note typical of the genre.
Due to the nature of the topic and the commentary, including applicable judicial opinions, a
traditional casenote "treatment" would be wholly ineffective not only to argue the issue
effectively, but also to appropriately influence the intended audience. As such, the passion
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The phenomenon producing this climatic shift comes from the
revival of a tool used throughout American socio-jurisprudential history
to achieve oppositional silence in any of a number of social issues. It is the
SLAPP-the Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation. Briefly put,
SLAPP filers take constitutionally protected petitioning activity out of the
public forum and force it into the courtroom, where the chilling expense of
litigation effectively freezes the often shallow-pocketed SLAPP target into
silence. The SLAPP filer focuses on use of the judicial process, as opposed
to any anticipated judicial product, to silence the opponent.4 Unfortunately,

is preserved within and throughout the legal analysis-including that of academicians in the
field, that of lawmakers, and that of the author. For those who prefer a more traditional
treatment, the author offers no apologies whatsoever the author will brook no disrespect to
passion.
4. This activity is included in those constituting the "sham" exception to the nearabsolute protection of petitioning afforded by the Constitution's First Amendment. When
exposed, the suit falls squarely within that proscribed by the Supreme Court in City of
Columbiav. Omni OutdoorAdvertising, Inc., 499 US. 365,380 (1991), and dismissal is imminent.
The Omni court, with relative surgical precision, drew the fine line of distinction between
protected and unprotected petitioning activity when it takes place inside the courtroom.
However, the Omnidoctrine's test for dismissal was not drawn to such clarity with the first
stroke. What follows is a brief overview of the court's journey to Omni.
While petitioning activity was to receive considerable protection, see supra note 2, it was
not to be without qualification. McDonald v. Smith, 472 US. 479,483 (1985) (in an action for
hlbl); Bill Johnson's,461 U.S. at 743 (qualified right in actions other than defamation); PRING
& CANAN, supra note 1, at 19. The court's reluctance to recognize an absolute privilege for
petitioning activity such that would propel the protection above those freedoms of speech and
press, id. at 23, forced the court to find the point at which first amendment protection would
be inappropriate. In 1983, the Bill Johnson's court removed from the first amendment right to
petition a suit that is "a 'mere sham' filed for harassment purposes." Bill Johnson's, 461 U.S.
at 741. The court noted that the NLRB, below, also recognized that "going to a judicial body
for redress of alleged wrongs... stands apart from other forms of action directed at the
alleged wrongdoer." Id. (quotingPeddle Buildings, 203 N.LR.B. 265,272 (1973)). Even though
the Bill Johnson'scourt dearly saw the suit as a weapon to "get even" with an employee "and
to chill the waitresses' federal rights with a coercive lawsuit[L" the court allowed the case to
go forward merely to unwind an extrajudicial dismissal order that appeared to usurp the
court's function. PRING &CANAN, supra note 1, at 20-21.
In 1975, the McDonaldcourt attempted to apply the "actual malice" standard established
in Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). See McDonald, 472 U.S. 480 (1975). Pring and Canan
describe the result of the application of this test to SLAPPs as the court's final slide into the
"fact quagmire" that SLAPP targets seek so dearly to avoid. Here, the defamee must be
proven to be a "public figure," and the target's conduct must be proven to have fallen below
a standard of care higher than that of "negligence." PRING & CANAN, supranote 1, at 22-23.
Oddly, it would be the prior Noerr-Penningtonline of 1960s antitrust cases that would allow
the court to reach, in the 1991 Omni decision, a process/product distinction that would allow
the court to clearly delineate between petitioning activity protected by the first amendment
and litigation that is being used as a weapon. In FAstern RailroadPresidentsConference v. Noerr
Motor Freight,Inc., 365 U.S. 127 (1961), long-haul trucking companies and major railroads
waged a "no holds barred" fight for favorable legislation. Tactics included unethical business
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ultimate, even timely, dismissal, as will be shown, is wholly inadequate
because the damage has already been done-the filer's goal has been more
than effectively accomplished.
Legislative, judicial and procedural legions are rallying against the
upswing in SLAPPs.' While this note deals briefly with the panoply of
PPALS, the note's focus is on sanctions under state procedural rules based
on Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (FRCP) 11. The note argues that state
adoption of a sanctions rule based on the current version of FRCP 11, when
coupled with appropriately calculated sanctions, can effectively deter
SLAPPs6 while protecting access for novel claims. New Mexico's SWOP
will serve to maintain this focus throughout the note.

conduct on both sides, deception, falsification of references and distortion of public sources
of information. Id. at 140. The court stated that while such conduct was certainly unethical,
id., in that both parties deliberately deceived the public and public officials, id. at 145, such
conduct did not constitute a violation of the Sherman Act and was protected petitioning
activity. Id. While Noerrprotected petitioning activity that is "done for an illegal purpose or
with the intent to violate the law," PwRNG & CANAN, supranote 1, at 24, the court drew short
at an absolute privilege and alluded to the sham exception: "There may be situations in which
a publicity campaign, ostensibly directed toward influencing governmental action, is a mere
sham to cover what is actually nothing more than an attempt to interfere directly with the
business relationships of a competitor .....
Noerr, 365 U.S. at 144.
Four years later, the court in United Mine Workers of America v. Pennington,381 U.S. 657
(1965) pasted a veneer of absolutism on petitioning activity when it trounced both lower
courts for not according proper weight to the Noerrholding that "anticompetitive purpose did
not illegalize the [petitioning] conduct there involved." Id. at 669. The Pennington court
reiterated that "Bloint efforts to influence public officials do not violate the antitrust laws even
though intended to eliminate competition." Id. at 670; see also PRING & CANAN, supranote 1,
at 25. This combination of decisions became the Noerr-Penningtondoctrine-as close to an
absolute right to petition as the court would allow.
Though still in the antitrust context, the first significant sham exception to Noerr-Pennington
appeared seven years later in CaliforniaMotor Transport v.Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508
(1972) where the court found that by a "pattern of baseless, repetitive claims" petitioners
sought "'to discourage and ultimately to prevent the respondents from invoking' the
processes of the administrative agencies and courts and thus fall within the exception to
Noerr." Id. at 512-13; see alsoPRING &CANAN, supra note 1, at 25.
It would be the NAACP that would release the Noerr-Penningtondoctrine from the throes
of antitrust constraints. In NAACP v.Claiborne HardwareCo., 458 U.S. 866 (1982), the court
found, in a boycott, the same intention to influence governmental action, the same
foreseeability and the same intention to inflict economic injury as in the prior antitrust cases.
Id. at 914. The distinction lies in the absence of the desire to destroy legitimate competition.
Id. The Omni court held that Noerr-Penningtonapplied to the nonviolent aspects of a boycott
and that such activities were protected under the first amendment. Id. at 915.
5. In addition to Rule 11 sanctions, weapons against SLAPPs (or PPALS of present and
future SLAPP targets) include anti-SLAPP legislation, countersuits, and early dismissal. These
approaches will be discussed briefly in a later section of this note.
6. Or, if you will, one of the many PPALS that can be used to turn back a SLAPP.
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SWOP, a not-for-profit dedicated to empowering communities of
color, has been recognized for speaking out against social and economic
injustice. As will be fully discussed in this note, SWOP is being sued for
exercising its petitioning voice. The suit has been characterized as a SLAPP.
SWOP, then, first serves to reveal the vulnerabilities of potential SLAPP
targets residing in states like New Mexico that use a form of the original
1937 version of federal Rule 11. Second, SWOP serves as representative of
all SLAPP targets that could benefit from a few loyal PPALS. Finally,
SWOP functions as an effective guide through the interrelationships of
petitioning activity, SLAPPs, and sanctions under Rule 11 as potentially
one of the best PPALS SWOP, as well as all SLAPP targets, ever had.
This note first illuminates the disturbing trend with historical
background of SLAPPs, and, in order to emphasize the need for PPALS,
particularly the potent deterrent force of sanctions available under Rule 11,
events giving rise to SWOP's SLAPP. The background section concludes by
highlighting inherent weaknesses in the deterrent power of the predecessor
versions of federal Rule 11 that continue to be the rule of procedure in
many states. The note then discusses the current status of and various
responses to SLAPPs, followed by an examination of the deterrent force
under the current federal rule. The analysis compares weaknesses inherent
in the deterrent capability of the predecessor versions and corresponding
potential strengths offered by the rule as amended in 1993.
In its final main section, this note argues for sanctioning guidelines
to be applied by judges in the SLAPP context based on state adoption of a
form of the current version of federal Rule 11. In this section the note calls
for judicial activism in not only entertaining an expanded definition of
allowable sanctions under the Rule but also more aggressively applying the
sanctions scheme to achieve chilling deterrence commensurate with the
importance of protecting this most significant of Constitutional rights.
II. BACKGROUND
A. SLAPPs
1. Definition by Implication
On a purely empirical level, a lawsuit qualifies for the SLAPP label
if it involves communications made to produce a desired governmental
outcome and those communications resulted in a civil complaint or
counterclaim filed against nongovernment individuals or organizations on
a substantive issue of some public interest or social significance. However,

7. PIiNG & CANAN, supra note 1, at 8-9.
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a more compelling definitional picture emerges by observing the effects of
SLAPPs not only on defendant "targets" but also on society as a whole
when SLAPPs enjoy unequal protection under the law.s While virtually
destined to fail in court," SLAPPs succeed in silencing the community voice
and jeopardizing representative democracy. 10 SLAPPs have an average
duration of 40 months, during which time the target is silenced from
pursuing its cause by being forced to engage in defense of the suit.'2 In
essence, the fier's suit SLAPPs robust social debate off the soapbox and

into the jury box.'
Not only do SLAPPs silence people for speaking out, SLAPPs
silence peoplefrom speaking out as well. Many former SLAPP targets vow
to think twice about future activism. ' In addition, bystanders, oftentimes
friends, neighbors or colleagues, gaping at the SLAPP target twisting in the
judicial wind, are likely to become similarly discharged as a democratic
force.' s

8. Obviously, the injustice that is revealed when one merely peers through the lens of
legalese cannot begin to do justice to a proper definition of SLAPPs. After observing a SLAP?
in theater one must step outside the courtroom for a breadth of social implication in order to
fully appreciate the definition of a SLAPP as much more than merely a jurisprudential
frivolity. See supranote 3. As will be explained in subsequent sections of this note, Rule 11
attempts to prevent frivolous suits while protecting novel claims. When the Rule 11 balancing
fulcrum is placed so as to favor protection, as will be shown to currently be the case in states,
including New Mexico, that use a form of Rule 11 in, for the most part, its original form, both
SLAPP filers and their attorneys enjoy insufficient deterrence.
9. PmNG &CANANsupra note 1,at 1 (due to finding that the case succumbs to the NoerrPennington"sham" exception); see supranote 3.
10. PRmI &CANAN, supra note 1,at 2; Lafayette Morehouse, Inc. v. Chronicle Pub. Co.,
44 Cal. Rptr. 2d 46 (Ct. App. 1995). "SLAPP litigation, generally, is litigation without merit
filed to dissuade or punish the [target's] exercise of First Amendment rights .... Id. at 48.
11. Alexandra Dylan Lowe, The Price of Speaking Out, A.B.A.J., Sept. 1996, at 48, 50. The
suit against SWOP was still pending after 41 months. Telephone Interview with Louis Head,
staff member, SWOP (April 8,1998).
12. Lowe, supranote 11, at 50.
13. PRING & CANAN, supranote 1, at 2.
14. Id. at 5 ("Iwon't circulate another petition, and my husband wants me to get out of
[community issues]." "I don't want my name on anything.").
15. Lowe, supranote 11, at 49 (quoting Gordon v. Marrone, 590 N.Y.S.2d 649 (Sup. Ct.
1992)) ("People have disappeared into the woodwork."); PRING & CANAN, supra note 1, at
28-29. It is left for another to author a note dealing with the issue of whether SLAPPs are a
more sinister form of prior restraint. "tPiror restraints on speech and publication are the most
serious and the least tolerable infringement on First Amendment rights." Nebraska Press
Ass'n v. Stuart,427 U.S. 539,559 (1976). BLACA'S defines prior restraint as "any scheme which
gives public officials the power to deny use of a forum in advance of its actual expression."
BLAcm's LAW DICrIONARY 1194 (6th ed. 1990) (emphasis added).
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George Pring and Penelope Canan, SLAPP researchers with the
University of Denver's Political Litigation Project,16 are to be credited with
unmasking those who wish to trade free speech for personal profit. They
have sounded the alarm for the need to address this most urgent threat to
the Constitutional right to petition. 7 Due in major part to their efforts,
SLAPPs have gained recognition both broad and wide. Legislators and
judges have begun to take up the call to constitutional arms, recognizing
that SLAPPs need not only be deterred, but also chilled."8 New York's
Justice Nicholas Cobella, writing for the Gordon majority, could not have
summarized SLAPPs more accurately: "Short of a gun to the head, a
greater threat to First Amendment expression can scarcely be imagined."19
2. Development and Recognition
Although SLAPPs faltered over at least one definitional stumbling
block and have only recently become the recipient of increasing
recognition and intense scrutiny,21 the definitive focus of a SLAPP has
emerged as involving activity covered by the petition clause of the First
Amendment.' It would not be intuitively incorrect, then, to surmise that
the frequency of SLAPPs would vary with a corresponding degree of
general political or social unrest.' The initial wave of SLAPPs, according
to the results of a study performed by Pring and Canan's Political
Litigation Project, 4 washed upon American shores, not surprisingly, with
the birth of our nation.' Shortly thereafter, with a citizenry preoccupied
with the building of a nation, SLAPPs, and the political and social unrest
that incites them, abated.'

16. PRiNG & CANAN, supra note 1, at 2.
17. Id. at 15-19.
18.

Gordon v. Marrone, 590 N.YS.2d 649,654 (Sup. Ct. 1992), affd, 616 N.YS.2d 98 (App.

Div. 1994).
19.

Id. at 656.

20. Nestle Food Co. v, Miller, 836 F. Supp. 69,78 n.34 (D.RI. 1993) (SLAPP is a suit "filed
in retaliation for another's lawsuit").
21. PRING & CANAN, supranote 1, at 3.
22.

Id.; see supranote 1; Gordon, 590 N.YS.2d at 656.

23. PRING & CANAN, supra note 1, at 3.
24. Id. at 2.
25. Id. at 3,17,227 n.24 (citing Harris v. Huntington, 2 Tyl. 129 (Vt. 1802)) (case dismissed
when county justice of the peace sued five citizens for $5,000 for libel when they petitioned
the state legislature not to reappoint him).
26. Id. at 3.
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In the wake of an increasingly diverse society, SLAPPs reemerged
over a century and a half later in a dizzyingly clever array of guises.' The
legacy of the 1960s placed the citizen activist as a permanent fixture on the
American landscape.s Numerous political,' religious," social 1 and
environmental causes of subsequent decades brought with them not only
their respective advocates but also those who wished, via SLAPPs, to sue
those collective voices into silence.'
Current literature reveals that the citizen voice is again very much
at risk. In typical SLAPP theater, real estate developers sue landowners

27. Id. See, for example, id. at 2,223 n.3 (citing McDonald v. Smith, 472 U.S. 479 (1985))
(writing a letter to the president of the United States opposing a political appointment); id. at
2, 224 n.8 (citing Lange v. Nature Conservancy, Inc., 601 P.2d 963 (1979)) (recommending
county acquisition of open space); id. at 2,224 n.11 (citing Perlman, Alta Dena Sues Its Critics
for $780,000,000, SAN FRANctsco CHRONICLE, June 22,1985) (testifying before Congress or a
state legislature); id. at 2,224 n.12 (citing Streif v. Bovinette, 411 N.E.2d 341 (1980)) (reporting
a violation of law to health authorities); id. at 2,224 n.10 (citing North Star Legal Found. v.
Honeywell Project, 355 N.W.2d 186 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984)) (demonstrating peacefully for or
against government action); id. at 3,224 n.15 (citing Chavez v. Citizens for a Fair Farm Labor
Law, 148 Cal. Rptr. 278 (Ct. App. 1978)) (ballot issue campaigning).
28. Id. at 3.
29. Id. at 6,227 n.32 (citing Hickox, Criticsof City Hall Slapped with Suits, ORANGE COUNTY
REGJSTER, Apr. 7,1995, at 1) (retirees spoke out against city pensions).
30. Id. at 227 n.43 (citing Cole v. Lehman, No. 85CV2187 (Dist. CL Adams County, Colo.,
filed Sept. 1985)). "Conservative religious parents complained to school authorities about a
liberal grade school teacher in a suburb of Denver. The teacher won a $250,000 jury verdict
for their 'defamation."' Id. at 7.
31. Id. 227 n.35 (citing Central Transportation, Inc. v. Stephens, No. 1978-2083 & 19782475 (Ct. C.P., Cambria County, Pa.) (dismissed 1979). "Pennsylvania parents, alarmed over
reports of unsafe school buses, voiced their concerns at a school board meeting. The bus
company filed a $680,000 suit for 'libel' against 68 parents." Id. at 7.
32. Id. at 227 n.34 (citing Dixon v. Super. Ct., 36 Cal. Rptr. 2d 687 (CL App. 1994)).
An anthropology professor fought to preserve an ancient Indian village
found on his California State University campus, before the university
buried it in apartment buildings and retail stores. He wrote letters to
government officials protesting lack of compliance with California's
Environmental Quality Act and was sued for $570,000 by the university's
consulting firm for "negligent interference with contractual relations,"
"libel," "slander," and "trade libel."
Id. at 6.
33. Id. at 3. For a most illustrative example, testimony revealed practices of the Church
of Scientology included its doctrine of "fair game," whereby litigation was employed "to
bludgeon the opposition into submission,... [and) according to written policy, [the Church]
will use any means legal or illegal to subvert and frustrate judicial process against them, and
will willingly and knowingly abuse judicial process in order to attack perceived 'enemies."
Church of Scientology of California v. Wollersheim, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d 620, 627-28 (Ct. App.
1996).

NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL

[Vol. 38

who speak out against a proposed development.' In addition, Pring and
Canan identified SLAPPs in areas as diverse as speaking out at school
board meetings,' filing a complaint over shoddy home repairs,-, and protesting license renewals.' Pring and Canan's research found the Sierra
Club to be "the nation's leading SLAPP target."' Consistent with that
finding, the suit in which SWOP is currently involved includes the Sierra
Club as the first named defendant." SWOP's suit is explicitly mentioned in
Pring and Canan's book-the authors characterized the suit as a SLAPP
because the Sierra Club published a book in which an article by SWOP
founder Richard Moore and staff member Louis Head appears.'
B. SWOP GETS SLAPP'D
Founded in 1981, SWOP is a multi-racial, multi-issue, communitybased non-profit organization based in Albuquerque, New Mexico.41
SWOP's mission is to "empower the disenfranchised in the Southwest to
realize racial and gender equality, and social and economic justice."'
SWOP's efforts include calling for meaningful jobs, advocating for tax
policies favoring local communities rather than multi-national
corporations, assisting communities in their efforts to speak out against
undesirable development, supporting immigration rights, and providing
community education on issues critical to people of color.' SWOP

34. PRiNG & CANAN,supra note 1, at 30-45; Westfield Partners, Ltd. v. Hogan, 740 F.
Supp. 523 (N.D. I1. 1990) (developer who planned to use thoroughfare as access to
subdivision sued landowners who petitioned successfully to have thoroughfare abandoned
as a road); see also Edmondson & Gallagher v. Alban Towers Tenants Ass'n, 829 F.Supp. 420
(D.D.C. 1993); Lafayette Morehouse, Inc. v. Chronicle Publ'g Co., 44 Cal. Rptr. 2d 46, 51 (Ct.

App. 1995).
35. PRING & CAN, supra note 1, at 7,227 n.35 (citing Central Transportation, Inc. v.
Stephens, No. 1978-2083 & 1978-2475 (Ct. C.P., Cambria County, Pa.) (dismissed 1979).
36. Id. at 7,228 n.46 (citing Bass v. Rohr, No. 1103642 (Cir. Ct., Anne Arundel County,
Md., Mar. 28,1983), affd 471 A.2d 752 (1984)).

37. Id. at 119,7,227 n.40 (citing Ross Investment Corp. v. The Northeast Community
Org., No. 80122 812/22500 (Super. Ct., Baltimore County, Md., dismissed per stipulation Mar.
27,1984)).
38.

Id. at 85.

39. SBP Corp. v. Sierra Club, No. 94-11903 (Dist. Ct El Paso County Tex. filed Nov. 2,
1994).
40. PRING & CANAN, supra note 1,at 87; see Richard Moore & Louis Head, Building a Net
That Woirks: SWOP, in UNEQUAL PRorECnON: ENVIRONmENTAL JUsTICE AND COMMUNmES OF
COLOR 191 (Robert D. Bullard ed., 1994).
41. VOCES UNiMAS (SWOP newsletter, Albuquerque, N.M.), May 1996, at 20.
42. Id.
43. SWOP publicity literature (1996).
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encourages public participation through a variety of methods, including
non-partisan voter registration drives."
SWOP's image, then, is that of an activist organization that
endorses, encourages, and engages in public participation in equitable
causes. As such, SWOP also has the capacity to be viewed in its
photographic negative as a developer's, polluter's or discriminator's worst
nightmare.
In addition to the broad-based coalition-building activities noted
above, SWOP also participates in many individual community efforts. One
such effort involved assisting the citizens of Sunland Park, New Mexico-a
Chicano-Mexicano community located at the junction of New Mexico,
Texas and Mexico.' A community of predominately immigrant laborers,"6
Sunland Park also borders the Camino Real landfill.47 Since its opening in
1987,* the landfill accepts residential waste from El Paso, Texas as well as
waste from Mexican maquiladoras.4'
Concerned about the environmental effects of the landfill on their
community, Sunland Park residents formed the Concerned Citizens of
Sunland Park (CCSP) in the late 1980s.s' CCSP sought and received broad
support from a variety of labor, religious and legal organizations."1 CCSP
also, in 1990, solicited assistance from SWOP. 2 SWOP, consistent with its
mission, advised the group on strategies to attain greater voice for its concerns.' CCSP and its supporters were able to not only effectuate the closure
of a medical waste incinerator operating on the Camino Real landfill site
but also to obtain assurances from the New Mexico Environment
Department (NMED) that groundwater contamination from the landfill
would be monitored and maintained within regulatory limits.'
44. Id.
45. Interview with Louis Head, SWOP staff member, in Albuquerque, N.M. (July 17,
1996).
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id. A maquiladora,or "twin-plant," is typically an American manufacturing facility
located in Mexico in close proximity to the U.S.-Mexico border.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id.; In re. Application of Nu-Mex Landfill, Inc. and Joab, Inc. for a Solid Waste Facility
Permit for the Nu-Mex Landfill Facility, Decision and Order - Parts I and 2 (1991) (Part 1
covers the landfill and recycling facility, while Part 2 addresses the medical waste
incinerator).
At the prehearing conference, the following parties were permitted by the
hearing officer to intervene in the hearing1. Concerned Citizens of Sunland Park
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SWOP's advisory and participatory activities with respect to
"social, racial, and economic justice" are described in an article that is
included in a 1994 Sierra Club publication.' Co-authored by SWOP
founder Richard Moore and staff member Louis Head, the article describes
SWOP's efforts to coalesce people of color into a unified whole.' According
to Moore and Head, SWOP was instrumental in the formation of the
Southwest Network for Environmental and Economic Justice (SNEEJ), an
organization designed to unify and educate newly-formed activist groups
such as CCSP, with an emphasis on empowerment within political
decision-making processes.' In short, SNEEJ is dedicated to breathing
powerful political voice into organizations composed of people of color.
In a section of their article subtitled Shattering a Myth, authors
Moore and Head describe the genuine concern that minority groups share
regarding social and environmental issues and, by way of supporting
examples, defend the validity of those concerns.-" The authors describe
how communities of color are routinely exploited by groups that range
from local governments to private waste disposal companies-referring to
the situation at Sunland Park and the medical waste incinerator that was,
prior to the time their article was published, located on the landfill site.' In
their article, the authors characterize vulnerable locales such as Sunland
Park as "endangered communities. " ' °
Due in part to the Sierra Club's publication of Moore and Head's
article, on November 2,1994, SBP Corporation, its parent company Rubbish
Removal, Inc. and Joab, Inc. (doing business as Nu-Mex Landfill), owners
and operators of the Camino Real landfill, filed suit in El Paso, Texas District Court against the Sierra Club and various of its subsidiaries and
chapters, SWOP, and contributing authors Richard Moore and Louis

2. Southwest Research and Information Center.

3. Sunland Park Planning and Zoning Commission
4. Consulado General de Mexico

5. Catholic Diocese of Las Cruces
6. El Paso Inter-Religious Sponsoring Organization
7. Southwest Organizing Project
8. Work on Waste U.S.A.
Part 2 id. at 9.
55. Moore & Head, supra note 40, at 191.
56. Id. at 192. The authors characterize these groups as traditionally foreclosed from
social justice. Id. at 194.
57. Id. at 192-93.
58. Id. at 195-97.
59. Id. at 198.
60. Id.
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Head."' SBP sought actual, special and exemplary damages in excess of
jurisdictional minimums, pre-and post-judgment interest, costs of suit as
well as "other and further just relief." 62
SBP's petition alleged that "plaintiffs have endured shame,
embarrassment, humiliation, mental pain and anguish"' as a result of
defendant's "conscious indifference to the rights and welfare of
Plaintiffs";" that Moore and Head's article contains "libelous and
slanderous statements"; that the heightened level of scrutiny of the
landfill as required by the NMED and associated costs and expenses were
proximately caused by "demonstrations, unfounded complaints and the
environmentalactivism of Defendants.""
From the above claims, one might conclude, as did Pring and
Canan, that SWOP is being sued because its environmental activism and
public participation resulted in assurances from the NMED that the
residents of Sunland Park would be neither breathing nor drinking
unacceptable quantities of medical or landfill waste. If so, one would have
to see this suit as a Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation and
conclude nothing less than SWOP was SLAPP'd.
C. FRCP Rule 11 - The Toothless Tiger?
Judicial confusion in finding a Rule 11 violation, coupled with
judicial reluctance to impose sanctions sufficient to deter, stem from the
fact that the very same First Amendment right that protects SWOP's, as
well as all citizens' right to speak out on matters of local interest also
protects SBP Corp.'s and other plaintiffs' right of valid access to the
courts.' Thus, "[dirafting a sanctions provision that preserves the goals of
redressing litigation abuse and encouraging fair access to the courts has
proven to be a daunting task. " ' Federal Rule 11 continues to struggle, as
it has from its inception, to strike the appropriate balance between
deterring frivolous filings and providing a forum for novel claims.

61. SBP Corp. v. Sierra Club, No. 94-11903 (Dist. Ct El Paso County, Tex.) (filed Nov. 2,
1994).
62. Id. at 14.
63. Id. at 12.
64. Id. at 13.
65. Id.at 5.
66. Id. at 7-8 (emphasis added).
67. Bill Johnson's Restaurants, Inc. v. NLRB, 461 U.S. 731, 741 (1983).
68. Byron C. Keeling, Toward a Balanced Approach to "Frivolous" Litigation: A Critical
Review of FederalRule 11 and State Sanctions Provisions, 21 PEPP. L. REV. 1067,1071 (1994).
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1. FRCPRule 11 (1937)

Federal Rule 11, first enacted in 1938, carried no special significance.69 Narrow in scope," the rule required that the lawyer's signature
merely certify that the lawyer had not only read the pleading but also held
a good faith belief that there is "good ground to support it."' Enacted with
the original body of Federal Rules? during a relatively harmonious period
not only between bench and bar but also between civil parties,' the
purpose of the rule was not so much to ensure factual or legal merit, but
more to deter a strict subjective intent to abuse the federal judicial process.74
2. FRCPRule 11 (1983)
With the outburst of civil litigation during the late 1970s, judges
required more effective case management and sanctions seemed a useful
tool.' However, the 1937 version of Rule 11 was not up to the task,

precipitating the 1983 update.7 6

69. Id. at 1074.
70. Id. at 1075.
71. The original version of Rule 11 required that:
[elvery pleading of a party represented by an attorney shall be signed by at
least one attorney of record in his individual name, whose address shall be
stated. A party who is not represented by an attorney shall sign his pleading
and state his address. Except when otherwise specifically provided by rule
or statute, pleadings need not be verified or accompanied by affidavit. The
rule in equity that the averments of an answer under oath must be overcome
by the testimony of two witnesses or of one witness sustained by
corroborating circumstances is abolished. The signature of an attorney
constitutes a certificate by him that he has read the pleading; that to the best
of his knowledge, information, and belief there is good ground to support
it; and that it is not interposed for delay. If a pleading is not signed or is
signed with intent to defeat the purpose of the rule, it may be stricken as
sham and false and the action may proceed as though the pleading had not
been served. For a wilful violation of this rule an attorney may be subjected
to appropriate disciplinary action. Similar action may be taken if scandalous
or indecent matter is inserted.
FED. R.CIV. P. 11 (1938).
72. Keeling, supranote 68, at 1074; see supra text accompanying notes 20-23.
73. Id. at 1076.
74. Id. at 1075; FED. R.Civ. P. 11 (1938) at committee's notes.
75. Keeling, supra note 68, at 1076-77.
76. Id. A 1988 report from the Federal Judicial Center supports the claim that pre-1983
procedures inadequately deterred frivolous claims and defenses. THOMAS E. WILLGING,
FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, THE RULE 11 SANCTIONING PRocEss, 15 (1988).
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The 1983 version of federal Rule 11" was enacted to increase Rule
11's deterrent effect " by reducing judicial reluctance to imposing
sanctions,' applying the appropriate standard of attorney conduct and
administering appropriate sanctions.' Judicial interpretation of the "good
ground to support it" provision of the original version gave sway to the
factual and legal elements of the 1983 amendments."' The amendments
deleted provisions for striking sham pleadings and willfulness as a
prerequisite for discipline.' Thus, the 1983 amendments attempted to
broaden the scope of sanctionable actions, raise the standard of attorney
behavior and encourage the application of sanctions as a deterrent tool.'
The 1983 amendments focused on the need for signing parties to
perform a prefiling inquiry' into both facts and law that was "reasonable

77. As amended, Rule 11 required that:
[e]very pleading, motion, and other paper of a party represented by an
attorney shall be signed by at least one attorney of record in the his
individual name, whose address shall be stated. A party who is not
represented by an attorney shall sign his pleading, motion, or other paper
and state his address. Except when otherwise specifically provided by rule
or statute, pleadings need not be .verified or accompanied by an affidavit.
The rule in equity that the averments of an answer under oath must be
overcome by the testimony of two witnesses or of one witness sustained by
corroborating circumstances is abolished. The signature of an attorney or
party constitutes a certificate by him that he has read the pleading, motion,
or other paper, that to the best of the his knowledge, information, and belief
formed after reasonable inquiry it is well grounded in fact and is warranted
by existing law or a good faith argument for the extension, modification, or
reversal of existing law, and that it is not interposed for any improper
purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase
in the cost of litigation. If a pleading, motion, or other paper is not signed,
it shall be stricken unless it is signed promptly after the omission is called
to the attention of the pleader or movant. If a pleading, motion, or other
paper is signed in violation of this rule, the court, upon motion or upon its
own initiative, shall impose upon such person who signed it, a represented
party, or both, an appropriate sanction, which may include an order to pay
to the other party or parties the amount of the reasonable expenses incurred
because of the filing of the pleading, motion, or other paper, including a
reasonable attorney's fee.
FED. ILCiv. P. 11 (1983).
78. Id. at advisory committee's notes; WILLGiNG, supra note 76, at 14.
79. Due to confusion in finding a violation. FED. R. Civ. P. 11 (1983) at advisory
committee's notes.
80. Id.; see 2A JAME W. MOORE, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTIcE 1 11.0211.-l at 11-22 (2d ed.
1996).

81.
82.
83.
84.

FED. R.Civ. P. 11 (1983) at advisory committee's notes.
Id.
Id.

Id.
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under the circumstances,"' signaling a shift to an objective standard"
which was quickly adopted within the federal circuits.8 " However, that
signing parties were required to find the document well grounded in fact
and law to the best of their "knowledge, information and belief" alluded
to a subjective standard.8' Nonetheless, the courts largely ignored this
subjective interpretation." One amendment that was not ignored, however,
was the mandatory imposition of sanctions, which could include
reasonable expenses and'attorney's fees.' The objective standard, coupled
with mandatory sanctions, evolved into a "potent tool of the Courts." 91
The 1983 amendments, however, brought double-edged results-a
more effective tool to deter frivolous litigation and an explosion of sanctions litigation.' The 1983 adjustments begat even more judicial confusion
in both finding violations and imposing sanctions than did the 1937 version." Exploiting judges' initial comfort with the Rule's objective standard
and perceived potential as a deterrent force, parties became more likely to
request sanctions, further lulling judges into more frequent, but less confident, application, further inviting parties to file sanctions motions, and so
on." In addition, the objective standard proved less precise than its predecessor,?' which, coupled with the award of attorney's fees as an allowable
sanction, had the effect of chilling the filing of marginal or novel claims.
At the appellate level, judges applied a "hands off" abuse of
discretion standard that encouraged ever-increasing sanctions awards and
reinforced the chilling effect on colorable claims."' In sum, the 1983
amendments propelled judges into a sanctioning tailspin that tipped the
balance inappropriately towards deterrence at the expense of free access.
3. FRCP Rule 11 (1993)
It would be merely a decade before federal Rule 11 would receive
another adjustment designed to strike the elusive balance between the
competing interests of deterrence of frivolous suits and free access for

85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.

FED. R. Civ. P. 11 (1983).
Keeling, supra note 68, at 1078.
WILLGING, supra note 76, at 22.
Keeling, supra note 68, at 1078.
Id. at 1079.
FED. R.Civ. P. 11 (1983).
Gordon v. Marrone, 590 N.Y.S.2d 649,653 (Sup. Ct. 1992).
Keeling, supra note 68, at 1077.
Id. at 1080-81. See generally 5A CHARLEs A. WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL
PRAcncE ND PRocEDURE § 1332 (1990).
94. Keeling supra note 68, at 1080.
95. Id. at 1081.
96. Id. at 1083.
97. Id. at 1089 & n.105.
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modifications of law and novel claims.9 Consistent with this goal, the 1993

98. FED. R.Civ. P. 11:
(a) Signature. Every pleading, written motion, and other paper shall be
signed by at least one attorney of record in the attorney's individual name,
or, if the party is not represented by an attorney, shall be signed by the
party. Each paper shall state the signer's address and telephone number, if
any. Except when otherwise specifically provided by rule or statute,
pleadings need not be verified or accompanied by affidavit. An unsigned
paper shall be stricken unless omission of the signature is corrected
promptly after being called to the attention of the attorney or party.
(b) Representations to Court. By presenting to the court (whether by signing,
filing, submitting, or later advocating) a pleading, written motion, or other
paper, an attorney or unrepresented party is certifying that to the best of the
person's knowledge, information, and belief, formed after an inquiry
reasonable under the circumstances,(1)it is not being presented for any improper purpose, such as to harass or
to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation;
(2) the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions therein are warranted
by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for the extension,
modification, or reversal of existing law or the establishment of new law;
(3) the allegations and other factual contentions have evidentiary support or,
if specifically so identified, are likely to have evidentiary support after a
reasonable opportunity for further investigation or discovery; and
(4) the denials of factual contentions are warranted on the evidence or, if
specifically so identified, are reasonably based on a lack of information or
belief.
(c) Sanctions. If, after notice and a reasonable opportunity to respond, the
court determines that subdivision (b)has been violated, the court may,
subject to the conditions stated below, impose an appropriate sanction upon
the attorneys, law firms, or parties that have violated subdivision (b) or are
responsible for the violation.
(1) How Initiated.
(A) By Motion. A motion for sanctions under this rule shall be made
separately from other motions or requests and shall describe the specific
conduct alleged to violate subdivision (b). It shall be served as provided in
Rule 5, but shall not be filed with or presented to the court unless, within 21
days after service of the motion (or such other period as the court may
prescribe), the challenged paper, claim, defense, contention, allegation, or
denial is not withdrawn or appropriately corrected. If warranted, the court
may award to the party prevailing on the motion the reasonable expenses
and attorney's fees incurred in presenting or opposing the motion. Absent
exceptional circumstances, a law firm shall be held jointly responsible for
violations committed by its partners, associates, and employees.
(B)On Court's Initiative. On its own initiative, the court may enter an order
describing the specific conduct that appears to violate subdivision (b)and
directing an attorney, law firm, or party to show cause why it has not
violated subdivision (b)with respect thereto.
(2) Nature of Sanction; Limitations. A sanction imposed for violation of this
rule shall be limited to what is sufficient to deter repetition of such conduct
or comparable conduct by others similarly situated. Subject to the limitations
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amendments broadened the scope of sanctionable activity while placing
greater constraints on the imposition of sanctions." To achieve its purpose
with greater judicial certainty, the current rule requires federal district
courts to give sanctions decisions heightened scrutiny."° To that end,
section (c)(3) requires specific findings of fact, including a description of the
conduct constituting the violation and the basis for imposing the
sanction. 10 1
III. DISCUSSION
A. Turning SLAPPs Around: PPALS
1. Non-JudicialPPALS
The legal community has begun to recognize and respond to the
upswing in SLAPPs. 1m A variety of deterrent PPALS is emerging in the
states.l's Legislative approaches include anti-SLAPP statutes requiring a

in subparagraphs (A) and (B), the sanction may consist of, or include,
directives of a nonmonetary nature, an order to pay a penalty into court, or,
if imposed on motion and warranted for effective deterrence, an order
directing payment to the movant of some or all of the reasonable attorneys'
fees and other expenses incurred as a direct result of the violation.
(A) Monetary sanctions may not be awarded against a repsented party for
a violation of subdivision (b)(2).
(B)Monetary sanctions may not be awarded on the court's initiative unless
the court issues its order to show cause before a voluntary dismissal or
settlement of the claims made by or against the party which is, or whose
attorneys are, to be sanctioned.
(3) Order. When imposing sanctions, the court shall describe the conduct
determined to constitute a violation of this rule and explain the basis for the
sanction imposed.
(d) Inapplicability to Discovery. Subdivisions (a) through (c) of this rule do
not apply to disclosures and discovery requests, responses, objections, and
motions that are subject to the provisions of Rules 26 through 37.
Id.
99. Id.at advisory committee's notes. These provisions were also designed to stem the
tide of motions for sanctions awards. Id.
100. Keeling, supra note 68, at 1090.
101. Section (c)(3) requires that "[when imposing sanctions, the court shall describe the
conduct determined to constitute a violation of this rule and explain the basis for the sanction
imposed." FED.R. CIV. P. 11(c)(3).
102. Due in no small part to the efforts of Pring and Canan's Political Litigation Project.
103. While this note concerns itself with state motions for sanctions based on adoption of
a form of federal Rule II, sanctioning guidelines and recommendations discussed in this note
apply equally with respect to SLAPPs filed at both the state and federal level.
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review of the merits of a suit that smacks of a SLAPP, shifting and
heightening burdens of proof of unprotected conduct)s staying discovery
and shifting fees."° To date, at least nine states have passed legislation
which allows defendants to file special motions to strike SLAPPs,
grounding the target's acts in Constitutional immunity from prosecution
for exercising First Amendment petition rights." Pring and Canan also go
so far as to provide model anti-SLAPP legislation.'
In addition, SLAPPs have received attention among both the bar
and the popular media." A recent issue of the American Bar Association
Journal devoted its cover and lead article to SLAPPs. ° The article
documents the efforts of Nancy Hsu Fleming, a naturalized citizen, who
was sued for speaking out over contaminated ground water from a
neighboring landfill.m Although Fleming ultimately won dismissal of the
suit,11 2 the Fleming voice was silenced for four years." Absent increased

recognition of and action consistent with Justice Cobella's "gun to the
head" level of concern,
yesterday's Nancy Hsu Flemings will

104. Lowe, supra note 11, at 52. For example, the court in Westfield PartnersLtd. v. Hogan,
740 F. Supp. 523 (N.D. 111. 1990), skeptical of the plaintiff's underlying purpose in filing the
suit, felt that the suit could be characterized as a SLAPP and dismissed the complaint. Id. at
524-25.
105. Lowe, supranote 11, at 52.
106. Id.
107. Id. "California, Delaware, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Nebraska, Nevada, New York,
Rhode Island, and Washington - have adopted modern, 'active' anti-SLAPP statutes...."
PRING & CANAN, supra note 1, at 189; id. at 198, 262 n.61 (CAL CODE Civ. PROc. § 425.16
(1992)); id. at 195, 261 n.41 (DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, §§ 8136-38 (1992)); id. at 199, 263 n.72
(MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 231, § 59H (1994)); id.
at 200,263 n.80 (MINN. STAT. §§ 554.01-05 (1994));
id. at 195, 261 n.42 (NEB. Rsv. STAT. §§ 25-21, 241-46 (1994)); id. at 193, 260 n.22 (NEv. REv.
STAT. §§ 41.640-70 (1993)); id. at 195, 261 nn.30, 32, 35-38 (N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAw §§ 70a(1)(a)-<c), 76-a(1)(a)-(b), 76-a(2) (1992), N.Y. C.P.L.R. 3211(g), 3212(h) (1993)); id. at 199,263
n.72 (R.I. GEN. LAws §§ 9-33-2, -3 (1995)); id. at 192, 260 n.13 (WASH. REv. CODE §§
4.24.500-.520 (1989)).
108. PRING & CANAN, supra note 1, at 201-05.
109. See Mark A. Chertok, Sanctions As A SLAPP Deterrent:How Effective Are They? ALIABA Course of Study, C935 A.LI.-A.B.A. 117 (1994); PRING & CANAN,supra note 1, at 224-27
nn.20-23. Note 20, id. at 224-25, cites "over 20 recently reported federal and state court
opinions using the word "SLAPP". Note 21, id. at 225-26, cites over 30 professional and
scholarly articles written on "SLAPPs." Note 22, id. at 226, cites numerous articles from
periodicals ranging from Playboy to the Wall Street Journal. Note 23, id. at 226-27, cites
coverage of SLAPPs on TV including L.A. Law as well as "more serious" coverage on a variety

of news programs.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.

Lowe, supra note 11, at 48.

Id.
Hometown Properties, Inc. v. Fleming, 680 A.2d 56 (R.I.1996).
Lowe, supra note 11, at 50.
See supra text accompanying notes 18-19.
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increasingly become today's SWOPs. Given appropriate and reliable
means, the bench can become one of a SLAPP target's most formidable
PPALS. Fortunately, the judiciary, analogous to the Concerned Citizens of
Sunland Park, is beginning to find its voice.
2. PPALS on the Bench
With increasing momentum, courts have begun to consider the
alarming nature of SLAPPs1 and the important policy issues they raise.1 6
1 7 included in their opinion a virtual
The court in Gordon v. Marrone"
reiteration of Pring and Canan's most pertinent findings."" The court
conferred judicial validation on the notion that the SLAPP filer succeeds in
silencing a most deserving and legitimate participatory voice by forcing
social debate into the courtroom and foisting the expenses of litigation on
the target." 9 The court also recognized both the value to the fier in
churning litigation and judicial reluctance to grant early dismissal."0
Appropriate judicial treatment of SLAPPs requires two major
strategies: first, proper identification and expedient removal of SLAPPs
once filed and second, deterrence sufficient to eliminate future filings.n
Prompt dismissal hinges on shifting both attorneys' and judges' focus
away from the elements of defendant's alleged tort' and in the direction

115. Westfield Partners Ltd. v. Hogan, 740 F. Supp. 523,524-25 (N.D. I1. 1990).
116. Petrochem Insulation, Inc. v. Northern California and Northern Nevada Pipe Trades
Council, 1992 WL 131162 at *12 (N.D. Cal. Ma. 19,1992) (irrespective of the label, litigation
costs and threats of damages could, and should not, chill public participation).
117. 590 N.Y.S.2d 649,656 (Sup. Ct. 1992).
118. Id.
119. Id.
This case, like other SLAPP, attempts to turn the petition clause on its head
by using the right to petition to indirectly punish the prior exercise of the

right to petition by others.
The Court adheres to its finding in this case that this is a SLAPP suit by
virtue of the lack of any evidence establishing a substantial legitimate

purpose.
Id.
120. Id. "Needless to say, an ultimate disposition in favor of the target often amounts
merely to a pyrrhic victory." Id.
121. PRiNG & CANAN, supra note 1, at 143; Lowe, supra note 11, at 51. Admittedly,
expedient dismissal of the suit, once established in such cases, wreaks significant deterrent
havoc on a filer whose only goal is to chum litigation. Gordon v. Marrone, 590 N.Y.S.2d 649,
656 (Sup. Ct. 1992). This note, however, argues that this level of deterrence is wholly
insufficient in the SLAPP context.
122. Usually libel, business interference or conspiracy. PRiNG & CANAN, supranote 1,at
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of plaintiff's petition clause violation."' Once dismissed, then, strong
deterrence is required to produce the chilling effect that is at once both
desired and deserved.""
Recommended common law PPALS include "SLAPP-back" suits
for abuse of process or malicious prosecution."z However, countersuits,
while increasingly popular as the public awakens from the shock to the
conscience that a SLAPP delivers, are usually not PPALS of choice for the
typical SLAPP target who has succeeded in obtaining appropriate early
dismissal of the suit, due to the target's constrained resources and decided
preference for participation in societal processes via alternative means.
State-level PPALS can also include sanctions under procedural
rules modeled after FRCP 11. The following section argues for judicious
application of sanctions under state adoption of a procedural rule based on
the 1993 amended federal Rule 11, as opposed to the predecessor
versions." Under the proposed sanctions scheme, judges can effectively
prevent SLAPPs from ever reaching the courthouse steps, thus providing
the desired deterrent effect.
B. Sanctions as a DeterrentForce
Currently, at least 12 states, including New Mexico, use the 1937
version as the foundation for their sanctions motion procedure." New
Mexico, of federal rule 11 for one, continues to express difficulty with the
Rule's application and indicate its desire for adoption of a more useable

123. Id. at 152. Identification of a SLAPP as a violation of the petition clause based on the
Noerr-Penningtonsham exception, see supra note 4, is outside the scope of this note. However,
a thorough treatment of recommended procedures for dismissal of SLAPPs on petition clause
grounds is offered in PRiwm AND CANAN, supra note 1, at 143-67. See also City of Columbia v.
Omni Outdoor Adver., Inc., 499 US. 365 (1991) (antitrust action); McDonald v. Smith, 472 U.S.
479 (1985) (libel); Bill Johnson's Restaurants, Inc. v. NLRB, 461 U.S. 731 (1983) (unfair labor
practice); Westfield Partners, Ltd., v. Hogan, 740 P. Supp. 523 (N.D. I1. 1990) (four counts,
including conspiracy and slander); Gordon v. Marrone, 616 N.Y.S.2d 98 (App. Div. 1994) (suit
to annul tax assessment).
124. A motion for sanctions must be filed separately from a motion for dismissal. FED. R.
Civ. P. 11(c)(1)(A).
125. Lowe, supra note 11, at 53; we Leonardni v. Shell Oil Co., 254 Cal. Rptr. 883 (CL App.
1989) (action for malidous prosecution brought in response to action for injunctive and
declaratory relief).
126. PRING & CANAN, supranote 1, at 11; interview with Louis Head, supranote 45.
127. Lowe, supranote 11, at 53.
128. It would not be inappropriate to hope that the argument presented here will find
support among states currently using a form of the 1983 amended federal Rule 11 as well.
129. Keeling, supranote68,at1073n.25(ALA.R.CIv.P. 11; IND. TRIALR. 11(A);ME.R.CIV.
P. 11; MD. R.Civ. P. 1-311(a)-(c); MASS. R.CIV. P. 11(a); Miss. R.Civ. P. 11; N.H. SUPER. CT. R.
15; N.M. R. Crv. P. 1-011; OHIO R. Cv. P. 11; R.I. R. Crv. P. 1023; S.C. R. Crv. P. 11).
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rule.' In sum, the version's subjective standard coupled with discretionary
sanctions provides, albeit consistent with the Rule's intent, little, if any,
capability for deterrence in the context of a suit filed in violation of the
petition clause. The Rule fiercely protects access to the courts at the expense
of deterring none but the willful abuser of the judicial process.
1. FRCP Rule 11
While judges remain shouldered with the burden of locating the
balance within each case, federal Rule 11 now allows judges to more
effectively reach an appropriate balance. The 1993 amendments broadened
the domain of sanctionable activity, offered a dearer set of guidelines with
which to find such activity, and specified a wider range of requirements
necessary to uphold the order.' In sum, there are three issues with which
both federal courts and states using a form of the 1993 amended version of
federal Rule 11 continue to struggle: (1) the definition and identification of
"frivolous" suitsun (2) the related standard of conductP of which SLAPPs
are part and parcel, and (3) the striking of a justicable balance between
deterrence of litigation abuse and occurrence of an accessible court
systemY"
Within the context of SLAPPs, the paths to identification and
removal are dearly marked.' Adequate procedural tools are both available
to safeguard an accessible system and capable of effectively deterring
SLAPP filers. While now more able to hold violating parties and/or their
attorneys in the tongs of Rule 11, it remains for judges to wield the hammer
of appropriate sanctions to forge searing judicial mettle into chilling
constitutional deterrence.

130. The New Mexico Court of Appeals recognized potential "difficulties encountered by
federal courts in interpreting Federal Rule 11 prior to the 1983 amendment [in order] to alert
our supreme court should it wish to reexamine our own Rule 11." Cherryhomes v. Vogel, 804
P.2d 420, 422 (N.M. Ct. App. 1990). For now, New Mexico has been fortunate in that its
appellate courts have not had to wrestle with sanctions motions in any more serious a contest
than the misconduct presented in Rivera v. Brazos Lodge Corp., 808 P.2d 955 (N.M. 1991),
"another episode in the seemingly endless saga of the Tierra Amarilla Land Grant." Id. at 957.
131. See supra text accompanying notes 98-101. On a significantly related issue, the court
in Gordonv. Marrone, 616 N.Y.S.2d 98 (App. Div. 1994) ruled that an award of sanctions to
redress abuse does not impermissibly infringe upon the First Amendment right of access to
the courts. Id. at 102 ("Any effect [enforcement of the sanctions rule] may have on substantive
rights, .... ,is merely incidental and not prohibited (d., Business Guides v. Chromatic
CommunicationsEnter., Inc.,... 111 S. Ct. 922, 933-34...)").
132. Keeling, supra note 68, at 1070.
133. Id. at 1132.
134. Id. at 1071.
135. See supra note 123.
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2. SLAPP SanctioningSchemes and Sanctions Sufficient to Deter
While the procedural balance is now more appropriately struck
federal
Rule 11 as amended in 1993,"' the Rule's intent and effect can
with
easily be undermined if sanctions are not calculated and awarded
commensurate with the depth and breadth of deterrence required. Current
sanctions schemes remain skewed in favor of protection of access at the
expense of protection of First Amendment rights. 37 The 1993 amended
version of federal Rule 11 limits awards of monetary sanctions against
represented litigants.' Under most state sanctions schemes, regardless of
the standard of conduct, an award to another party of expenses and fees is
the largest sanction that a court might impose. 9
For a typical SLAPP filer, a cost/fee sanction can be seen as merely
a business cost,' particularly if the suit is recognized as a SLAPP and
dismissed appropriately early."' In such cases, any deterrent effect is
completely lost."a Only with the imposition of sanctions in excess of fees
can the proper deterrent effect be realized." While this sanctions scheme
should arguably be reserved for subjective bad faith violations,"
intentional abusers of the judicial process should expect judges to find

136. FED. R. Civ. P. 11 at advisory committee's notes.
137. There are, in addition to this author, others who seek to again readjust the balancing
point. The Attorney Accountability Act of 1995, H.R. 988, passed the House by a 232 to 193
vote on March 7,1995 and was placed on the Senate Legislative Calendar on March 15 of that
year. The bill would reinstate mandatory sanctions, remove the safe harbor provision and
require an award of reasonable expenses and attorney's fees to the prevailing party on a
motion for sanctions, delete section (d), thus making sanctions applicable to discovery, and
reverse the language of section (c)(2) from limiting sanctions to affirming that:
[a) sanction imposed for a violation of this rule shall be sufficient to deter
repetition of such conduct or comparable conduct by others similarly
situated, and to compensate the parties that were injured by such conduct.
Subject to the limitations in subparagraphs (A) and (B), the sanction may
consist of an order to pay to the other party or parties the amount of the
reasonable expenses incurred as a direct result of the filing of the pleading,
motion, or other paper that is the subject of the violation, including a
reasonable attorney's fee.
H.R. 988,104th Cong. (1995) (no proposed changes to subparagraphs (A) and (B)).
While the proposed amendment would allow an award to a SLAPP target of direct expenses
as well as attorney's fees, this note argues that this award is wholly insufficient to produce the
desired deterrent effect.
138. FED. R. Civ. P. 11 at advisory committee's notes; Keeling, supra note 68, at 1092.
139. FED. R.Civ. P. 11 at advisory committee's notes; Keeling, supranote 68, at 1143.
140. Keeling, supra note 68, at 1144.
141. See supratext note 123; PRING &CANAN, supranote 1, at 3.
142. Keeling, supra note 68, at 1154.
143. Id.
144. Id.
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evidence of subjective bad faith sufficient to impose sanctions in excess of
fees.' SLAPP fiers, once discovered, €' could not unreasonably expect to
fall into this category. This sanctions scheme thus may ease some of the
difficulty caused by the subjective/objective dichotomy, and, while not
producing a perfect balance between deterrence and access, at least tipping
these particular scales more appropriately in favor of encouraging PPALS
rather than SLAPPs, consistent with the intent of the Rule.
Specifically within the SLAPP context, imposing sanctions in excess
of costs and fees can produce an appropriate level of deterrence while
preserving access." While allowing any excess award to a SLAPP target
may be both an honorable social goal as well as a victory to the target,'4
federal sanctions in excess of fees must currently be paid into court
coffers. 1'49 While the deterrent effect might be enhanced if the award is
returned to the target,ss the typical SLAPP target, SWOP included, is
unlikely to pursue any allowable excess.' SWOP's, not unlike most SLAPP
targets', mission leans decisively towards exercising First Amendment
rights and away from becoming practiced in the high art of sanctions
recovery litigation5r Independent of forum and recipient, awards in excess
of fees and costs must nonetheless be levied in order to deter filing a suit.
Such suits too often succeed in, not only violating petitioning rights
protected by the First Amendment, but also silencing future participatory
voices as well.
Judges, traditionally disinclined to impose sanctions in excess of
fees and costs,' should draw their blueprint of sanctions to a scale broader
than merely those costs directly incurred by the named parties. For
instance, the SLAPP filer's costs include not only the direct fees and
expenses of litigation, but also, in some instances, the "costs" of goods and

145. Id. at 1155.
146. Once a suit is identified as a SLAPP, it is likely that the court found a petition clause
violation in that the suit fell into the sham exception of the Noerr-Penningtondoctrine-where
the filer seeks victory not via the end product of winning the suit but rather by using the
judicial process as a weapon against the target. See PRNG & CANAN, supra note 1,at 3,154; text
supra notes 4,119,123.
147. Section (c)(2) of federal Rule 11 states that a sanction shall be limited only by "what
is sufficient to deter repetition of such conduct or comparable conduct by others similarly
situated." FED. R.CiV. P. 11(c)(2).
148. In addition to early dismissal of the suit.
'149. FED. R. Cv. P. 11(c)(2).
150. Chertok, supranote 109, at 139.
151. Id.
152. Interview with Louis Head, supra note 45. However, there is no restriction on a state
that wishes to adopt a rule that authorizes a court to be more generous in its award to the
target.
153. Chertok, supra note 109, at 146.
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services not delivered to "customers" during the preparation, initiation,
and churning of the litigation. Similarly, the SLAPP target's "customers"
must bear the burden of unavailable goods or services while the target frets
and fights to preserve the freedom of free speech. In addition, judges
should consider "costs" to potential clients of counsel to all parties who are
denied access to otherwise valid legal services. Finally, "costs" to the court
should be included and can be defined as the value of valid suits not heard
while the SLAPP was devouring scarce judicial resources.
Admittedly, calculations under this sanctions scheme could require
extensive evidentiary hearings that would be counterproductive to the goal
of expediency. Nonetheless, a rule that would allow judges to calculate
sanctions up to a maximum percentage of the filer's net worth "s could
effectively encompass all relevant "costs," achieve justice for the target, and
send the appropriate message of deterrence to those similarly situated,
consistent with the intent of Rule 11.' It now remains for judges to
recognize the scope of the harm, realize that appropriate deterrent tools are
available, and revitalize the right to freely petition within American society.
IV. CONCLUSION
While not a recent phenomenon, SLAPPs are gaining popularity
as a procedure to silence opposition in a variety of social and political
contexts. Due to the combination of the disguised nature of the typical
SLAPP and judicial reluctance to both grant early dismissal and impose
sanctions commensurate with truly effective deterrence, SLAPP filers
currently enjoy a lack of restraint inconsistent with the federal Rule 11
manifesto-to preserve petitioning activity that seeks a valid judicial
outcome and to prevent that same activity when its design is to use the
judicial process as a weapon. Because SLAPPs also represent a potentially
pervasive violation of a constitutionally protected activity, heavy-handed
deterrence is appropriate and sanctions should be applied liberally when
a violation is found.
Notwithstanding the fact that the current version of federal Rule
11 is available to impose sanctions in excess of fees, many states still use a
modified form of the original rule, which affords SLAPP fiers the benefit
of a subjective standard. These states should consider adoption of a form
of the 1993 amended version of federal Rule 11 in order to benefit both
from its deterrent intent balanced with the preservation of access to judicial
mechanisms.
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percentage that would survive classification as "deterrence"
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Given the nature of a SLAPP and the First Amendment violation
it embraces, allowable sanctions under Rule 11 should be viewed broadly
to deter SLAPPs and return robust social and political debate to its rightful
eminence in the global rialto of public participation. Free speech is too
valuable, too precious a right to allow it to be anything less than free. While
difficult to place a dollar value on such injustice, attorneys and fiers
should be placed on notice that a SLAPP suit is cut from precious
constitutional cloth.
With a more aggressive sanctioning tool available, judges, in turn,
can become less pensive about wielding it to impose appropriate sanctions.
Judicial sanctions schemes should include an expanded definition of
allowable "costs" to turn back the tide of SLAPPs. Such costs should
include the value of goods and services withheld from the filer's and the
target's, as well as their attorneys', customer bases, in addition to resources
both consumed by the judiciary and lost to the attorneys while managing
the litigation. A percentage of the filer's net worth can be used to avoid
unnecessary evidentiary hearings and achieve chilling deterrence. With this
approach, sanctions can become one of the most effective PPALS in the
deterrent arsenal against SLAPPs. The constitutional value of the public
participant's right to petition, the private value to the SLAPP filer of that
participant's silence, and the societal value of an accessible court system
demand no less.
J. Reid Mowrer

